Tom's Blog on Politics

On Gramsci's Prison Notebooks' Notes on Politics

2009-05-18T09:30:00.000-07:00

“…in the case of the most advanced States…The superstructures of civil society are like the trenchsystems of modern warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defence which was still effective…” (p. 489)

This quote captures, succintly but effectively, the main problem which Gramsci confronts in his Prison Notebooks, namely the role played by civil society in the advanced industrialized states in preventing the popular classes from carrying out a communist revolution and, in the case of Italy, from stopping fascism.

Before turning to the content of the Notebooks, and providing a sketch of Gramsci’s ideas, it is worth bearing in mind the reason for this choice of subject matter on Gramsci’s part. And largely, I think we can find it by considering the context within which Gramsci lived. On a discursive level, the influence of thinkers such as Karl Marx and Benedetto Croce is unquestionable, but more important were Gramsci’s political activities, through which he witnessed first, in September 1920, a fatal blow to the possibility of a communist revolution after the leaderships of the Italian Socialist Party and the labour unions refused to back the factory occupations that had broken out in much of the country, opting to compromise instead, and, second, shortly after, the beginnings of fascist reprisals. In passing, I think it’s also worth mentioning that Gramsci’s imprisonment, a situation of extreme duress, coupled with his physical illnesses, make his contributions to political thought all the more remarkable.

Having said this, let’s turn to the readings.

The Notebooks are divided into three sections:

I. Problems of History and Culture
II. Notes on Politics
III. The Philosophy of Praxis

These are in turn divided into subsections. The sections we’re interested in are found within the Notes on Politics and they are:

The Modern Prince
State and Civil Society
Americanism and Fordism

In The Modern Prince, Gramsci interprets The Prince as Machiavelli’s attempt to politically educate the Italian people, “those who are not in the know”, and urge them to back a political project of national unification (pp. 332-335).

Here, Gramsci begins by saying that in order to understand Machiavelli, it is imperative to appreciate the political context of his time, characterized by:

1. Florence’s internal struggles;

and

2. A peninsula composed of a multitude of small states beleaguered on the one hand by warfare between each other and the constant attempts of the Popes to exercise temporal power, and on the other by threats coming from national realities such as France and Spain.

This state of affairs is a cause of great frustration for Machiavelli, who sees the national unification of Italy as the only solution. He therefore writes The Prince to promote this political objective, and elaborates on the means to achieve it by outlining the “…qualities, characteristics, duties and requirements of a concrete individual.” But, Gramsci reasons, since what Machiavelli espouses is already known and practised by those in power, who is he addressing? And the answer Gramsci gives is that the audience is not so much the De Medici family, as the Italian people, the citizen democracy, “those who are not in the know”, but who can help achieve unification if exposed to the rules of the game and if convinced to disregard morality and religion.

Gramsci sees the Jacobin movement as an embodiment of Machiavelli’s Prince, what he calls “an exemplification of the concrete formation and operation of a collective will”. He furthermore thinks that in order to obtain the political objective he is after, a communist revolution, the formation of such a collective will is also necessary. He concludes that what is needed is another Prince, a Modern Prince.

But being aware that each historical situation is unique, Gramsci thinks it’s not plausible to simply apply Machiavelli’s model -- the Prince in the form of an individual. He suggests however that history has provided an alternative, namely the political party. In the case of his political objective, a communist revolution, he thinks the Communist Party can play the role of the modern prince. To achieve a collective will whose aim it is to carry out a communist revolution, Gramsci thinks that the Communist Party has to unite peasants and industrial workers.

Is the situation ripe for such an alliance? And here Gramsci introduces the need for historical analysis, showing innovation in method first by noting the necessity of distinguishing between organic and conjunctural movements, that is between what are permanent from what are momentary historical phenomena, and second by advocating the need “to establish various levels of the relations of force” while analyzing not only those social relations within the sphere of production -- the structure -- but also those in the domain of ideology, culture, morality -- the superstructure -- and, indeed, to appreciate the dialectic relationship that exists between these two spheres of social relations. As Gramsci himself puts it, “It is the problem of the relations between structure and superstructure which must be accurately posed and resolved if the forces which are active in the history of a particular period are to be correctly analysed, and the relation between them determined.”

Gramsci argues that there are three different levels in the relations of forces. First, there is the relation born out of the development of the material forces of production, which creates the class composition of a society. This level can be measured objectively and quantitatively. Secondly, there is the relation born out of the level of class consciousness and the organizational configuration that arises from the latter. Here, it is possible to distinguish further, by identifying the different moments of development, going from the creation of corporate unions, to unions and political parties created along class lines, to political associations that unite all subordinate groups under a single leadership which gives the formation economic, political, as well as intellectual and moral unity. Gramsci then defines the final level in the relations of forces as military, the latter itself being divided between a purely military level and a politico-military level, that is political actions which provoke military repercussions.

In State and Civil Society Gramsci develops his notion of hegemony further, looking at the conditions which render the latter effective and outlining the general strategies to be adopted by the working class for a project of counterhegemony in the West.

He begins by elucidating the concept of Caesarism, a situation characterized by a stalemate between the conservative and progressive forces of society, and the entrustment of power to a single charismatic leader to transcend the equilibrium and prevent the destruction of both forces. Gramsci suggests that up until Napoleon III, Caesarism may have come about through the military actions of an individual, but that in the modern world it was necessary to consider organic entities, such as labour unions and political parties, as responsible for maintaining hegemony.

Gramsci thinks this is the case in the advanced industrialized states, where he considers the institutions of civil society as determinant for the realization of hegemony by the ruling class. After distinguishing between war of movement, an action characterized by the rapid conquest of power, and war of position, a more prolongued and constant struggle that seeks to wear down the enemy’s capabilities, Gramsci concludes, in agreement with Lenin, that a war of position is more appropriate for a project of counterhegemony by the working class here.

The Notebooks then turn to what at the time was a revolution within the capitalist mode of production, what Gramsci calls Americanism and Fordism. He uses these terms to capture industrial paradigms defined by mass production and undertaken in the context of a Taylorized labour process, paradigms which were becoming so prominent in the industrial sector of the United States. Gramsci thinks that this model is appropriate to America but not Europe, because the latter, unlike the former, is plagued by the survival of large groups of people (i.e. civil servants, the clergy, landowners etc.) with no productive function in the economy.

The higher degree of efficiency granted by the lack of these parasitic forces, has allowed a larger accumulation of capital, increases in wages, and lower commodity prices. The Fordist model has also required the influx of more workers. Hence the appearance of large groups of immigrants and young people, who have, as a result of their arrival, altered the composition of the working class, as well as its political outlook.

According to Gramsci, these shifts in the socioeconomic structure of the United States have made it necessary for the ruling classes to intensify their hegemonic activities, giving rise to educational and political programs aimed to regulate the private affairs of the workers, including restraining deviant sexual tendencies and the consumption of alcohol, activities which it was thought could interfere with muscular-nervous integrity and thus erode the labour power necessary for the continuation of production.

Gramsci notes that as is the case with more traditional industries such as farming, Fordism entails the creation of divisions within the workforce. As he puts it,

“It would be uneconomic to allow the elements of an organic whole so laboriously built up to be dispersed…This is a limitation on the law of competition determined by the reserve army and by unemployment, and this limitation has always been at the origin of the formation of privileged labour aristocracies.”

Thus, in Americanism and Fordism, Gramsci sees the expansion and intensification of more absolute forms of capitalist social relations, and can instinctively feel that their consequences in civil society will be profound.

These are in essence the themes explored in the three subsections mentioned, but three other definitions must be kept in mind when reading the Notebooks. The first is Gramsci’s uderstanding of the term organic intellectual, by which he has in mind people with an organizational function towards their respective social classes. In the case of the ruling classes, intellectuals are to perform the dual task of obtaining consent from the subaltern classes through cultural and ideological means, and, when this is not possible, to administer political domination through the coercive apparatus of the state. Not unlike in the army, within the intellectual category Gramsci notes that the division of labour is also subjected to hierarchy, and that often it is the lower intellectual strata to “display the most blatant espirit de corps.”

A second term which may be useful in performing historical analysis and which is utilized by Gramsci is that of passive revolution, by which is meant “A revolution that does not include a role for the masses.” Gramsci mentions the example of the Risorgimento.

Finally, he elucidates the concept of transformism, a word that has come to have a long tradition in Italian politics, and that is the “expression of intellectual, moral and political hegemony” by the absorption of elements from allied but apparently antagonistic groups.

I would conclude by suggesting that in writing the Notebooks, Gramsci’s purpose, much as the latter saw the attempt of Machiavelli in writing The Prince, was not that of obtaining a literary accomplishment, but of producing a political tool to be used. As he states:

“…analyses cannot and must not be ends in themselves (unless the intention is merely to write a chapter of past history), but acquire significance only if they serve to justify a particular practical activity, or initiative of will. They reveal the points of least resistance, at which the force of will can be most fruitfully applied; they suggest immediate tactical operations; they indicate how a campaign of political agitation may best be launched, what language will best be understood by the masses.”

Mail ad Annozero

2009-02-10T17:21:00.000-08:00

Riporto una mail scritta dal sottoscritto alla redazione di Annozero lo scorso 18 Gennaio:

Gentilissimi,

Volevo ringraziare la redazione di Annozero e Michele Santoro per avere avuto il coraggio di fare quello che la stragrande maggioranza della stampa e dei media occidentali non fanno mai, ovvero di informare e raccontare la verita' riguardo ai fatti che stanno accadendo a Gaza. Non credo affatto che data la situazione la trasmissione abbia avuto una tendenza filo-Palestinese. E comunque, anche se questo fosse accaduto (e ripeto non sono di questa opinione), sarebbe una piccola goccia in un mare di notizie ultra-filtrate per supportare la posizione Israeliana.

Inviterei il vostro ospite Andrea Nativi a osservare che un principio di proporzionalita' esiste eccome nella legge internazionale che riguarda i conflitti bellici. Vi do in inglese il principio, preso da Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportionality_(law:

"The incidental (i.e.- unintended) harm caused to civilians or civilian property
must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated by an attack on a military objective."

Detto questo, aggiungo, e credo che questo aspetto sia importantissimo, che i Palestinesi sono gli unici al mondo a dover accettare il diritto di esistere d'Israele. Osservo che questo non esiste assolutamente da nessun'altra parte. Ovvero, nessun paese deve accettare il diritto di esistere di un altro paese. Semmai, si accetta l'esistenza di un altro paese, ma non il diritto di esistenza. E anche se accettassimo questo nuovo principio (che come ho gia' detto non esiste), ci si dovrebbe chiedere se Israele accetta il diritto di esistere dei Palestinesi. Dati i fatti, direi certamente di no. Anzi, Israele nei fatti si dimostra dedicata alla distruzione di qualunque chance i Palestinesi abbiano di costruire un paese nel futuro. Credo che questa richiesta sia stata aggiunta dagli Stati Uniti ed Israele una volta che avevano appurato che le autorita' Palestinesi all'epoca di Arafat avevano riconosciuto l'esistenza d'Israele.

Concludo col rinnovarvi un ringraziamento per avere fatto il vostro dovere.

Spero che la trasmissione possa continuare anche se immagino che in Italia al giorno d'oggi remare contro sia molto difficile.

Un saluto dal Canada.

Thomas Carrozzier

A Critique of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Sciences and Arts

2009-01-18T11:21:00.000-08:00

In 1750, the Academy of Dijon offered a prize for the best essay on the question “Has the restoration of the sciences and arts tended to purify morals?” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, maintaining the negative, won the contest with an entry that would eventually be recognized as his first major literary work. In the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, Rousseau argued that gentrification, the process through which progress was commonly understood to be achieved, was responsible for the erosion of virtue, which he understood as “the strength and vigour of the soul” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 37). Rousseau claimed that a loss of virtue, in turn, would lead to mankind’s enslavement. In his opinion, the sciences and the arts collectively constituted the major drive behind the process of gentrification mentioned above. Whereas the slogan of the French revolution was to be “Freedom, equality, and fraternity”, that of Rousseau’s discourse is best summed up with his own words, in a call for a return to “…ignorance, innocence, and poverty…” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 62).

According to Rousseau, increase in knowledge, whether through scientific exploration or artistic expression, was responsible for an equivalent loss in man’s strength of character. Through an assessment of Rousseau’s discourse, and in particular through an examination of his understanding of the role of the military and that of formal education, I will show that this conclusion is ultimately flawed, and that increase in knowledge is likely to increase man’s strength of character. Above all, I wish to demonstrate that much of his discourse relies on assumptions that upon closer inspection seem unconvincing at best. Some passages, conveying Rousseau’s longing for a simpler past, display such naïveté one finds it hard to believe they could have been uttered by one of the founders of modern philosophy. Furthermore, Rousseau’s position is ironic, if not completely paradoxical. Indeed, were it not for his knowledge of letters, and thus for an understanding and appreciation of a form of art that is integral to the sort of civility which he allegedly repudiated, Rousseau would never have been able to launch the sort of critique that is found in this discourse. To explain the reasons of my disagreement with Rousseau, we turn to an analysis of the text.

A praise of Sparta’s ability to chase away “arts and the artists, the sciences and scientists” and a simultaneous criticism of Athens’ unwillingness to do the same, can be found within the first part of Rousseau’s discourse (Rousseau, 1964, p. 43). Shortly thereafter, Rousseau juxtaposes two periods of Roman history in an attempt to offer further evidence for this accusation. In this case, Rousseau stirs from the dead Fabricius, a “Roman commander and statesman whose incorruptibility and austerity were frequently regarded as models of the early Roman virtues” (Britannica, 2006), and makes him utter the following:

What disastrous splendour has succeeded Roman simplicity? What is this strange language?What are these effeminate customs? What is the meaning of these statues, these paintings, these buildings? Madmen, what have you done? Have you, the masters of nations, made yourselves slaves of the frivolous men you conquered? Are these rhetoricians who govern you? Is it to enrich architects, painters, sculptors, and comedians that you watered Greece and Asia with your blood? Are the spoils of Carthage the booty of a flute player? Romans, hasten to tear down these amphitheatres, break these marble statues, burn these paintings, chase out these slaves who subjugate you and whose fatal arts corrupt you (Rousseau, 1964, p. 45-46).

In addition to reiterating that Rousseau was not very fond of the “ingenious and learned” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 53-54), and of those who utilized arts and sciences for the progress of their societies, these two passages reveal another aspect of his thought, namely a fascination with bodily strength, or, as he calls it, “vigour” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 54-56). Indeed, as Sparta and Rome were notorious for their military prowess, in part, no doubt, because of the strength of their soldiers, we can deduce that Rousseau saw this as a necessary quality on which to build a virtuous society. He confirms this point quite explicitly when he states that “Even in the soldier, a little more strength and vigour would perhaps be more necessary than…bravery, which does not preserve him from death…” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 56).

Assuming but not conceding that military competence constitutes the basis of a virtuous society, and that a correlation exists between the strength of an army and the physical strength (i.e. vigour) of its soldiers, in order for Rousseau’s position to remain feasible, an increase in the knowledge of a people must lead to a decrease in the strength of its soldiers and therefore to that of its armies as well. To be sure, this is what Rousseau means when he states that “The Romans admitted that military virtue died out among them to the degree that they became connoisseurs of paintings, engravings, jewelled vessels, and began to cultivate the fine arts” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 55) and when he asserts that “Only a little sun or snow, or the lack of a few superfluities is necessary to dissolve and destroy the best of our armies in a few days” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 55).

Not accounting for hereditary characters, it seems reasonable to hold, as Rousseau does, that a man’s physical strength is related to the amount of physical activity he performs on a daily basis. It also seems reasonable to suggest, as Rousseau does, that the amount of physical activity a man performs on a daily basis is likely to be higher without the intervention of those externalities that enable man to spare his energies (i.e the sciences), and which may, in turn, lead man to expend his energies on activities that are not physically demanding (i.e. the arts). If both of these assumptions can be deemed true, then, for example, the invention of the wheel, a tool brought about by science which allowed man to transport materials with more ease, made man physically weaker. Rousseau’s suggestion that science has physically weakened man seems, in a way then, correct.

There is, however, an objection that can readily be made to counter this argument. Namely, that physical strength can be measured in numerous ways. So for instance, one’s strength may be, upon impact, more devastating than another’s due to the intensity of one’s brute force. However, one’s devastating strength may be rendered virtually useless due to another’s speed, the latter also being an indication of strength. The fact that physical strength is hardly solely equivalent to brute force introduces interesting questions, and throws a wrench in this part of Rousseau’s discourse. If physical strength, particularly within the context of war, which is, after all, the activity that a soldier is trained to engage in, is to be measured by brute force, it seems we cannot truly say that we could predict who among two soldiers of opposing armies would win. If the aim of theory is that of predicting phenomena, shouldn’t we refute Rousseau’s proposition and measure a soldier’s strength so as to predict, as much as possible, his ability of defeating his opponent? From such simple observations, we find fairly blatant inconsistencies in Rousseau’s notions.

Notwithstanding our initial objections, let us consider the matter further. Even assuming that a soldier’s physical strength, that is, his vigour, should be measured by brute force, Rousseau’s argument that increase in knowledge would decrease such strength still does not hold. Let us imagine, for instance, that two soldiers were up against one another in combat. The first is a soldier who has been unencumbered by the tools of modernity and is thus physically very strong. The second is a soldier who, despite possessing numerous tools that render his daily physical activities less strenuous, has been taught martial arts, and thus can maximize his overall strength, as well as that of his blows, to the fullest. Can Rousseau truly say, with certainty, that our first soldier would be able to defeat our second? The answer, clearly, is a resounding no. There is even room to suggest that our second soldier is much stronger than our first. We can see how in this case, by increasing one’s knowledge of combat through martial arts, one’s strength, and thus apparently one’s virtue, not only does not necessarily diminish, but may actually increase.

Let us recall that we have, thus far, only argued against Rousseau’s conclusions within the parameters he himself took for granted. That is, that military strength is a necessary precondition for a virtuous society. However, what evidence can Rousseau offer to substantiate his claim that this is so? He does, on two occasions, offer a glimpse of why he believes that strength, and military strength, are necessary. At the very beginning he maintains that “The needs of the body are the foundations of society…” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 36) and later on that “What view of hunger, thirst, fatigues, dangers, and death can men have if they are crushed by the smallest need and rebuffed by the least difficulty?” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 55). It appears, then, that he sees having and maintaining strength as the basis upon which to ensure the preservation of the species. This is not a controversial position, as besides being scientifically proven by models such as Maslow’s pyramid of needs, it follows logic as well.

Allegedly, there are two reasons why strength should be useful to achieve survival. In the first place, it would be useful to be able to survive in the event that all those tools we have come to rely on should at once disappear. The second reason is if we, whether as an entire people or personally, should come under attack from another. Rousseau makes it clear he sees the latter as the key reason of why military strength is essential. He cites numerous historical examples to prove this. For instance, when the Goths ravaged Greece, or when Charles VIII found himself as master of Tuscany and the Kingdom of Naples (Rousseau, 1964, p. 54). What he fails to consider, in my opinion, is that in both cases strength may be quite useless, and that in any case, a man’s intellect could replenish that which he lacked in strength. For his immediate survival, man may need to use his wit more than his strength, by knowing, for instance, how to build hunting weapons or how to start a fire. The same applies to when a society comes under attack by another. Strength alone, without the power of weapons that had been built with scientific knowledge, or without the ability of excogitating a plan of action through military strategy, may be utterly useless. We can see then, that Rousseau’s contention that knowledge is likely to decrease strength, the characteristic required for survival and thus the first precondition for virtue, is fallible and that strength, more often than not, must be complemented by knowledge if it is to be effective and build a virtuous society.

There is another problem with the arguments of Rousseau, namely in his methodology. Despite numerous examples of downfalls of societies, he offers no causation between the development of arts and sciences and these occurrences. All he appears to do is list examples of different historic epochs, without regard for context, circumstance, or other complicating factors that differentiate these cases from one another. For instance, the examples of Charles V and his successors and that of Cyrus and the Persian Empire are different in many ways. In the first place, the two are 2,000 years and 5,000 kilometers apart. Secondly, he does not provide a link of similarities between the two victors, namely England and Greece. Finally, he never considers what was the political situation in sixteenth century Europe and that in fifth century B.C. Middle East, when these two Empires capitulated. Therefore, what evidence do we have that his argument is substantiated by his examples? Furthermore, if we were to accept that his examples are appropriate, is the sample large enough to merit a pattern? His line of reasoning seems substantially weakened by his failure to adequately analyze his own examples and the faults these may contain (Rousseau, 1964, p. 51-52).

Furthermore, if virtue is understood as moral excellence and righteousness, one could suggest that the very institution of the military, because it is trained to engage in war, is completely immoral and thus runs counter to building a virtuous society. This is not an untenable argument. However, as this is an argument that clashes with Rousseau’s purely on a level of judgment, we shall leave it alone. We opt, instead, to close the argument on strength as a necessary precondition to virtue, and open another that was of interest to Rousseau, namely that of education. Rousseau makes the shift between these two aspects explicit when he states “If cultivating the sciences is harmful to warlike qualities, it is even more so to moral qualities. From our earliest years a foolish education adorns our mind and corrupts our judgment” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 56). Let us then consider his view on education and how it fails to support the thesis of the discourse.

Rousseau’s view on education can be seen in the crux of his thesis: knowledge is harmful. However, when he states that “…the sciences and arts owe their birth to our vices; we would be less doubtful of their advantages if they owed it to our virtues” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 48), in addition to showing his repudiation of knowledge, and thus of sciences and arts, Rousseau seems to admit, perhaps implicitly, that the desire for knowledge is borne out of human nature. Furthermore, throughout the discourse, Rousseau contends that man will be free only when he will be able to act as he sees fit. What other than this can Rousseau mean when he claims: “How pleasant it would be to live among us if exterior appearance were always a reflection of the heart’s disposition…”? (Rousseau, 1964, p. 37). In summary then, Rousseau’s discourse, and in particular its view on education can be seen to be underpinned by three principles. First, that knowledge is harmful. Second, that man’s desire for knowledge, and therefore his pursuit of it, is natural. Finally, that man can only be free when he is allowed to pursue that which is in his heart, namely his nature.

Rousseau’s statements that knowledge degrades man’s virtue and that human curiosity should be seen as a vice however, are at odds with his other positions, whether explicit or implicit, that human curiosity is a part of man’s nature and that man can strive for virtue only by returning to his natural state. A few questions seem to suffice to throw Rousseau’s notions into chaos. Is man’s desire to learn, for instance, about the nature of things, what Rousseau sees as a development of “vain curiosity” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 37), not merely one among many reflections of what he calls the heart’s disposition? Is man not acting according to his nature, and thus acting freely, even achieving a more virtuous character, when he pursues knowledge? How can what Rousseau sees to be the goal of an ideal education, namely the achievement of freedom from the burden of the sciences and arts, be feasible if it impedes freedom at the outset? If Rousseau is seeking a return to a primitive state where man is supposedly free to follow his heart, how can that be reconciled to the idea that some basic human desires, such as curiosity about the world around him, are vices that should be eliminated? The only way Rousseau’s assumptions can be merged with his conclusions would be for Rousseau to impose on mankind his moral values. Would this not be, simply, an exchange of a slavery he claims is imposed by civilization by one that is imposed by himself?

Rousseau’s view on education can also be discredited in another way. During the discourse, Rousseau appeals to Socrates, one of the greatest philosophers, in his eulogy of ignorance and tells us:

“Peoples, know once and for all that nature wanted to keep you from being harmed by knowledge just as a mother wrests a dangerous weapon from her child’s hands; that all the secrets she hides from you are so many evils from which she protects you…” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 47).

Besides the well known charge that Rousseau misquotes Socrates, omitting the latter’s reference to politicians, and substituting the terms artists for artisans, thereby redirecting the Socratic criticism to the particular targets central to [Rousseau’s] topic” (Rousseau, 1964, p. 8), Socrates’ words are clearly taken out of context. Socrates did not praise ignorance in its own right. Rather, he emphasized that as one’s knowledge increases, one’s awareness of his or her ignorance towards many other things becomes increasingly acute. This, in turn, necessitates that man should never cease his pursuit of knowledge (Rousseau, 1964, p. 44)
One last point seems sufficient to show that Rousseau’s arguments on education are rather weak. In a final passage, Rousseau states that:

“Those whom nature destined to be her disciples needed no teachers. Verulam, Descartes, Newton, these preceptors of the human race had none themselves; indeed, what guides would have led them as far as their vast genius carried them? Ordinary teachers would only have restricted their understanding by confining it within the narrow capacity of their own. (Part II, p. 62-63)

Without disputing Rousseau’s examples of what constitutes a great mind, or, as he calls them, “these preceptors of the human race”, he fails, in my opinion, to consider at least two important aspects. In the first place, Rousseau never considers the possibility that, although there may be some truth to the fact that people are born with great mental capabilities, these would have to be cultivated by others in. Who, other than teachers, be they formal tutors or family members, can engage in such cultivation? If this is true, then one can see what is the purpose of others, less great minds, to be involved in the education and the pursuit of knowledge. Secondly, Rousseau never mentions the role that sciences and arts have had in allowing these men to grow. Advancements in medicine, for instance, may be seen as responsible not only for the preservation of the species, as seen above, but also for preparing the ground upon which these great minds may flourish. This provides a good example of where science, and the learned men Rousseau scorns, may have served a purpose (Rousseau, 1964, p. 41).

In the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, Rousseau fails to prove that the sciences and the arts are responsible for man’s loss of virtue. In this essay, I have tried to demonstrate this by utilizing two of Rousseau’s main examples: that of the military and that of education. Using Rousseau’s own assumptions and conclusions, I have tried to demonstrate, furthermore, that the pursuit of knowledge is likely to increase a man’s virtue, as understood by Rousseau. Ultimately, it seems to me, it is not knowledge that enslaves men, but rather the utilization that men make of that which they discover. Depending on how this is done, sciences and arts can be tools for man’s emancipation and not enslavement. From a psychological standpoint, the position of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust is an interesting one. Faust is punished not because of his desire for knowledge, but for his uncritical desire for knowledge. This means that it is not man’s curiosity that should be thwarted, which is what Rousseau maintains, but how this is done and to what end.

Bibliography

Britannica. (2006). Fabricius. Retrieved March 29, 2006, from Britannica Web site: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9033530

Rousseau, J-J. (1964). Discourse on the Sciences and Arts. In R. Masters (Ed.) The First and Second Discourses. (pp. 31-64). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Russell, B. (2004). History of Western Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge.

Missiles and Metalworkers: A Case Against Imperialist Pension Funds

2008-10-19T17:23:00.000-07:00

On October 18, 2007, the Italian television-show Annozero, hosted by the avowed communist Michele Santoro, exposed an ugly truth of the neoliberal period. Italy’s metalworkers, known for their militancy and working-class consciousness, had unknowingly become cogs in the machine of financial oligopoly. During the episode, it was revealed that 46 percent of the metalworkers’ pension fund, COMETA, had been assigned to Duemme – Mediolanum and Mediobanca – financial institutions with dubious recent histories and close ties to former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Annozero, 2007). FIOM-CGIL, the largest of the three confederal metalworkers’ unions, retorted, once in a press release and a second time in a memorandum, that this was misinformation (Ferrante, 2007; FIOM-CGIL, 2007). According to them, only two percent of such funds had been assigned to Duemme – in consortium, as it turns out, with Societé Generale Asset Management, a subsidiary of the French bank which had recently been implicated in what the Financial Post reported to be “the biggest trading scandal in banking history” (Kar-Gupta, 2008) – and all funds are managed with transparency.

An important issue raised by this whole affair seems to be that, as John Kenneth Galbraith recognized in The New Industrial State, to the extent that ownership becomes dispersed, the right by the owners to intervene in the management of a company becomes illusory (Galbraith, 1985, pp. 81-82). Nay, that the more such a right is insisted upon by the professionals of the trade – according to Galbraith those intellectuals dedicated to the promulgation of vulgar economics, and in this case those responsible for managing the pension funds as well as the union officials promoting them – the more we can rest assured it has substantially waned. The implications of this modus operandi of modern capitalism are of course not limited to the working class, let alone to the more militant segments of that industrial working class, as in the case of Italian metalworkers, which in the core of the international capitalist system is on the decline. The implications affecting metalworkers do, however, render the contradictions of the modern capitalist system more strident, and underline its systemically exploitative nature.

The issue of pension funds began with Italy’s commitment to join the EMU, which meant conforming to Maastricht’s criteria and schedules, and thus adopting austerity measures to balance the country’s accrued public debt (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004, pp. 23-24). Along with these measures came a restructuring of the country’s pension system, which bifurcated what had previously been a uniquely state-managed system into a system based on private-public partnership. Under a ‘first pillar’ workers would continue to receive a minimum pension guaranteed by the state. In addition, under a ‘second pillar’, workers were given the option to contribute portions of their income throughout their careers into funds that would renumerate them upon retirement depending on market performance. Why then the sudden popularity of the issue? As of 2008, Italy’s pension reform enables workers to utilize their severance pay, an amount known as the trattamento di fine rapporto (TFR) which corresponds to approximately 7 percent of the gross salary and its yearly capitalization at a rate of 1.5 percent plus 0.75 percent of the actual inflation rate and which is set aside on a yearly basis by the employer, to contribute to such optional pension funds. The practice is innovative in so far as it allows the worker to deny his employer what had historically been, in essence, a loan at a low interest rate, since the TFR was kept in the company, and decide where to invest for his retirement (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 2008).

The prospect of being able to take a portion of one’s hard-earned income and invest it towards one’s retirement along with other workers, as opposed to leaving the money dependent on the fortunes of a single company, or to those of an individual portfolio, is of course alluring. The fact that, as of May 2005, 230,000 metalworkers have joined COMETA, which has current capital holdings equivalent to 3.5 billion Euros, attests to this (FIOM-CGIL, 2007). In its released statements FIOM-CGIL is adamant to point this out, and, furthermore, to offer a reason for this trend, namely that among the different pension funds available, the collective forms, those that encapsulate workers in a particular branch of industry (i.e. metalworkers) and that attach themselves to their respective unions (i.e. FIOM-CGIL), will be more stable, transparent, and advantageous than the individual forms. FIOM-CGIL underlines this by pointing, substantively, to the impressive rates of return obtained thus far by COMETA, and, procedurally, to (1) the right of the representatives of the owners of the funds (i.e. the metalworkers), known as the assembly, to vote on the yearly budget; (2) the instatement of a public competition after every management mandate expires; (3) the lower management costs associated with collective funds (FIOM-CGIL, 2006).

The reactions of the metalworkers of the Bergamo plant interviewed in Annozero however, strongly suggest otherwise. They suggest, above all, that many metalworkers are not aware of how their TFR ends up being invested through the fund. As one worker noted, “All I know is that [the TFR] goes into COMETA, and then that the money is managed by banks” (Annozero, 2007). The interview thus shifts to another location, where the interviewer meets with a financier to bring clarity to the situation and then report back to the workers. The interviewer asks if, in regards to the companies managing COMETA, companies such as Generali, Cattolica, Unipol, Ras, Duemme and Societé Generale Asset Management, one may hypothesize that the banks that own them could pressure their investment strategies. The financier admits that, although this is not the norm, it may occur. The financier goes on to add that it would be important to understand the criteria according to which these particular management companies were chosen by COMETA, since in the list provided by the interviewer there are no independent management companies. This, he adds, is most bewildering since, according to him, there are independent management companies within Italy and abroad that on the market have performed substantially better than those cited. Back at the Bergamo plant, after the interviewer related to the workers that their TFR seemed to be feeding the oligopoly of a few banks, many of the workers angrily claimed that they would rather have left their money within the company they worked for. Furthermore, when the interviewer questions the workers on whether they knew that a portion of their funds was being managed by financial institutions such as Duemme, and that these in turn finance firms such as Finmeccanica, which in association with other French firms are producing missiles, the response of the workers is angrier still, and the disgust reaches its zenith. As one worker shouts, “Had they told me that I was financing missiles I would not have done it!” (Annozero, 2007).

As noted, to this television episode the union responded, emphatically, that most of the funds were managed extremely conservatively, guaranteeing to the full extent possible a constant, if perhaps less impressive rate of return. In the response however, FIOM-CGIL misses the more ominous mark entirely. The reaction of the metalworkers shown in Annozero is not negative merely due to the consequences of investing in less competitive funds, although, to be sure, this is an aspect which weighs on the mind of anyone intent on retiring. The Bergamo metalworkers’, however, is for the most part a reaction of disgust in response to the political nature, the qualitative aspect of how their money is being invested. Relinquishing a portion of their necessary labour-time, what in Marxist accounting constitutes the present ability to reproduce oneself as a worker, not a small sacrifice, the metalworkers accept in order to guarantee themselves a decent standard of living in the future. In passing, it should not be forgotten that such a need is the result of neoliberal measures imposed from above so that Italy could enter the EMU. What the metalworkers cannot believe is that portions of their necessary labour time are handed over to capitalists who, in the first place, along with Berlusconi, had in the past attempted to repeal many of the victories historically achieved by the working class (i.e. Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute), and secondly, who utilize these funds to invest in the manufacturing of weapons necessary for the imperialist subjugation of other workers around the world.

In his arguments, as applied to the case of Italy’s metalworkers, John Kenneth Galbraith seems to have been right and wrong at the same time. Galbraith’s analysis was correct in seeing a transfer of power from owners to management. As seen, this is indeed the case with the metalworkers, who have a lack of knowledge, and hence power, in deciding which management company should administer their pension funds. Galbraith proved insightful in seeing that management would not always be most interested in profit-maximization since, after all, it was not their profits they were maximizing (Galbraith, 1985, pp. 128-129). Galbraith was also right in seeing that what he calls the technostructure, which in the case of the metalworkers is represented by the managers of the funds, will attempt to maximize the success of their organization, or, in the case presented here, the success of the mother-organization, namely the bank that owns the fund management companies (Galbraith, 1985, pp. 128-129). As a result of his discourse, he postulated “…the bimodal structure of the modern economy…” (Galbraith, 1985, p. xx), where oligopolies would come to hold a great extent of market power, and simultaneously fiercely reduce competition. All of this can be seen in the list of banks adopted by COMETA, which were chosen in spite of not being the most competitive.

Galbraith, however, was profoundly wrong in one aspect of his analysis, at least as it relates to the case of Italy’s metalworkers. Galbraith stated that

In the outermost circle in the mature corporation are the ordinary stockholders. This, for all practical purposes, is a purely pecuniary association. The typical stockholder does not identify himself with the goals of the enterprise; he does not expect to influence these goals. He has a share in the ownership; normally his only concern is that it return him as much money as possible. If he can get more income or capital gain with equal security elsewhere, he sells and invests there. No sense of loyalty – no identification with the goals of the enterprise – normally prevents his doing so” (Galbraith, 1985, p. 157).

This assumption does not hold true in the case of the metalworkers in their role as absentee owners since, in the first place, they are more than interested in taking an active role in the management of their funds. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, their ultimate goal is not profit maximization, but a balance between a rate of return that can guarantee them a decent future standard of living, and class solidarity with the workers that are going to be affected by the wherewithal provided by their investments.

Bibliography

Annozero. (2007). I Perdenti. Retrieved January 23, 2008 from Annozero Web site:http://www.annozero.rai.it/category/0,1067207,1067115-1075174,00.html

Ferrante, G. (2007). Il cilindro di Santoro. Retrieved January 23, 2008 from FIOM-CGIL Web site: http://www.fiom.cgil.it/fondi/sui_fondi/fp%20_061107.htm

Ferrera, M. and Gualmini, E. (2004). Rescued by Europe? Social and Labour Market Reforms in Italy from Maastricht to Berlusconi. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

FIOM-CGIL. (2006). Le pensioni e una replica a Report. Retrieved January 23, 2008 from FIOM-CGIL Web site: http://www.fiom.cgil.it/fondi/sui_fondi/fp%20_230606.htm

FIOM-CGIL. (2007). Previdenza Complementare. Fiom: ristabilire un’informazione corretta su Cometa dopo la trasmissione di “Anno Zero”. Retrieved January 23, 2008 from FIOM-CGIL Web site: http://www.fiom.cgil.it/stampa/2007/c_191007.htm

Galbraith, K. (1985). The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Kar-Gupta, S. (2008, January 25). French bank hit by worst scandal ever. The Financial Post.

Retrieved February 23, 2008 from Financial Post Web site:

http://www.financialpost.com/money/rrsp/Story.html?id=261291&p=1

Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale. (2008). Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione. Retrieved January 23, 2008 from Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale Web site: http://www.tfr.gov.it/TFR/LaRiforma/

Agency and Structure

2008-09-03T12:22:00.000-07:00

The release of two hip-hop albums, one in the form of a mixtape, provides a point of departure for a very interesting and in my opinion necessary debate. Nas, a well-known and extremely successful New York hip-hop artist who made his debut in the music industry in 1994 with the critically acclaimed Illmatic, just released Untitled (an album which was supposed to be released under the controversial title Nigger). Immortal Technique, a much lesser known and as a result underground artist, recently released, along with DJ Green Lantern (who interestingly also released a mixtape with Nas titled The Nigger Tape), a mixtape titled The Third World.

In spite of the differences in production quality, flow, rhyming structures, as well as other musical characteristics which clearly set the two artists apart, what is most important about their two albums is the very serious social issues which they deal with. These include racism, the U.S. war campaign in Iraq, civil liberties, the media oligopoly which controls the information to which we’re exposed, socioeconomic inequalities, the class configuration in capitalist society, and ultimately the web that links political and corporate leaders across nations to form the hegemonic power bloc of the global ruling class. Nas himself says this explicitly in the song We’re Not Alone where he states:

“I think it’s just been recent when everybody started to feel like there’s an elite group that runs everything, and everybody else was sheep, ignorant, making all ethnicities, colours and creeds niggers.”

In his review of Immortal Technique’s mixtape, Emilee Woods, who sees the need to explore commonalities and differences between Nas and Immortal in their two new albums, touches on a divergence between the two artists with a fitting and topical example, namely the upcoming attempt by Barack Obama to become the next U.S. president. I wouldn’t overemphasize Nas’ positiveness towards Obama, as Woods arguably does when he quotes, only in part, Nas’ verse discussing Obama’s potential positive effect on American society. Woods quotes the first part where Nas states:

“But on a positive side,
I think Obama provides hope and challenges minds
Of all races and colors to erase the hate
and try and love one another, so many political snakes”

He does not however finish off the verse, in which Nas claims:

“We in need of a break, I'm thinkin I can trust this brotha
...but will he keep it way real?
Every innocent nigga in jail, gets out on appeal
When he wins, will he really care still? I feel...

[Repeat 2X]

(‘Although
it seems heaven-sent,
we ain't ready, to have a black president’ 2Pac)”

In the second portion of the verse, Nas clearly questions Obama’s intentions to actually remain a progressive figure once he holds the presidential office (and this is of course assuming he will win the 2008 presidential election against McCain, a possibility which Nas seems to think remote, since he finishes off with the memorable Tupac quote from I Wonder if Heaven Got a Ghetto). I think Nas deserves a lot of credit for an insightful analysis of this situation from his point of view, even more so since he does so in rhyme, accentuating his abilities as an MC. But as Woods points out in his review, Immortal is more skeptical still. As immortal states with an ironic allusion to former President Bill Clinton:

“And they might even have a black president but he's useless
Cuz he does not control the economy, stupid!”

Here we see the clear break between the two points of view, and this is where the debate mentioned in the beginning of this piece arises. Whereas Nas, though skeptical, thinks it is within the realm of possibility that a president might implement substantial reform, Immortal deeply disagrees. The underground Latino artist thinks that an individual alone, no matter how progressive in his views, how coherent with them in his actions, and how much power he might hold politically, cannot reform the system (aside perhaps from making it less abusive) to such a degree that it will truly alter the way in which most people live. This chasm is part and parcel of the larger debate between those who emphasize the power of agency and those who emphasize the power of structure. To what extent is our reality constructed by ourselves and to what extent is it the result of historically inherited social institutions and norms that form our environment?

It’s apparently rather difficult to extricate ourselves completely from such a riddle. The safe answer is typically that even though it’s not impossible for the individual to change his circumstances, it’s not a given that this can be achieved either. I personally feel that an appropriate answer requires some clarification. In terms of a conflict individual vs. structure, I am of the opinion that the structure is more influential in that it sets up the individual with a set of circumstances and givens that are often overwhelmingly stronger than any willpower he may have. Consider for instance the peasant of a Third World countryside. Is it really within the realm of possibility that he change his circumstances radically if we consider all the barriers he faces, including those that are historical and psychological in nature and that shape his own worldview? The answer is a resounding no.

This however does not mean that individuals in their collective form cannot alter their social environment. After all, institutions and norms are socially constructed and this requires that they be made by humans, by collectives of individuals. If a sufficient portion of society finds that it is more suitable to change the givens they inherit from their predecessors, it is possible for them to do so. Were they to do so, this would be the result of agency, not of structure, but of a collective agency, not an individual one. In the case of the possibility of Obama president deeply restructuring America, even assuming the most noble intentions (not a small assumption), I am rather skeptical as is Immortal. But I am not so pessimistic (and as far as I can tell neither is Immortal) as to say that substantial change is not possible either. It is possible if the American people decide, as a collective, that this is in their interest.

In any event, whatever the most appropriate answer, I have to say that I welcome such a debate in music as I do in life in general. Most importantly, I especially like the revival these two artists are contributing to in making hip-hop the form of music it was intended to be: a cultural challenge to the exploitative power structure of modern society, and an additional venue for serious questioning of where we’re going as a people.

Evolution

2008-08-15T15:43:00.001-07:00

I recommend you pick up the August 25, 2003 special edition of Scientific American entitled "New Look at Human Evolution". It may be a bit dated since it is 5 years old, but there are many very well written articles on evolution.

In the first article by Kate Wong, entitled "An Ancestor to Call Our Own", Dr. C. Owen Lovejoy of Kent State University makes an interesting comment as to the debunking of the theory that hominids came to walk upright once they relocated in the African savanna. I reproduce here the small paragraph wherein it is found:

"...climate change may not have played as important a role in driving our ancestors from four legs to two as has been thought. For his part, Lovejoy observes that a number of the savanna-based hypotheses focusing on posture were not especially well conceived to begin with. 'If your eyes were in your toes, you could stand on your hands all day and look over tall grass, but you'd never evolve into a hand-walker,' he jokes. In other words, selection for upright posture alone would not, in his view, have led to bipedal locomotion. The most plausible explanation for the emergence of bipedalism, Lovejoy says, is that it freed the hands and allowed males to collect extra food with which to woo mates. In this model, which he developed in the 1980s, females who chose good providers could devote more energy to child rearing, thereby maximizing their reproductive success."

Made in U.S.A

2006-05-01T16:10:00.000-07:00

Fin dal secondo dopoguerra la cultura americana ebbe una grande influenza su quella italiana. In questo contesto l’industria cinematografica ed i gusti filmici degli italiani non fecero eccezione. All’epoca, erano i cowboys del far west a mandare in delirio le sale cinematografiche piene di spettatori, vuoi adulti, vuoi bambini. Da allora, si potrebbe dire che ci sia stata un’ evoluzione e che i gusti degli italiani siano cambiati: oggigiorno sarebbe impensabile produrre un film che glorifichi le azioni barbariche di quei “boys” dalla parlata stretta e dal grilletto facile che terrorizzavano e massacravano gli indiani d’America. Infatti, di film western se ne vedono oramai pochi. Ma l’americanizzazione di quest’industria, camuffata sotto il nome di globalizazione, continua apparentemente inarrestabile, rendendo l’Italia sempre più vulnerabile a “un modello unico di economia...un modello unico di pensiero...un modello unico di cultura.” (“Francofonia nel Mondo”, n.d.) Basta pensare che dal 1984 al 2001, tra i film prodotti in Italia, quelli italiani sono in costante calo, andando dal 34% al 19%, mentre quelli americani sono in costante crescita, andando dal 48% al 60% (Globalizzazione e Scelta Culturale, p. 107). Cosa esiste alla base di questo fenomeno?

Tra le molte ipotesi spicca quella, meno accettata perché scomoda, ma senza dubbio meno corrotta da forze ideologiche di potere, che può essere riassunta in una frase di Noam Chomsky: “Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state.” Ovvero, anche le democrazie come l'Italia si fondano in parte sul controllo della popolazione. Non essendo in grado di utilizzare con assoluta impunità la coercizione fisica, si affidano spesso a metodi meno percettibili (ovviamente ciò non vuol dire che le democrazie non usino la forza quando serve, come non si può dire che i sistemi totalitari non usino mezzi di propaganda). Il cinema si rivela un efficace strumento propagandistico perchè attrae numerosissime persone, divertendole ma allo stesso tempo cogliendole con la guardia del senso critico abbassata, riuscendo dunque ad iniettare idee che servono al potere per rimanere tale.

Nel caso dell’Italia, bisogna retrocedere agli inizi degli anni ’80 con il sorgere del gruppo mediaset, la tv privata di Berlusconi. Aprofittando di un terreno politico e di una legislazione radiotelevisiva favorevole e malleabile, creata appositamente dall’amico e allora Presidente del Consiglio Bettino Craxi, Berlusconi è in grado di trasmettere su scala nazionale programmi televisivi (Ginsborg, 2004, p. 28-56). Ma cosa trasmettere, si sarà chiesto il cavaliere a quei tempi. E qui non dovrebbero sorprendere più di tanto le scelte di film e telefilm americani. Tra i film molti appartengono principalemente a due generi. Il primo lo potremmo chiamare neo-western, con film del calibro di Warriors e 1997 Fuga da New York. Il secondo genere e’ quello delle commedie neorampanti degli attori reganiani del Brat Pack (Rob Lowe, Demi Moore, e Judd Nelson per intendersi), tra cui Pretty in Pink, Breakfast Club, e St. Elmo’s Fire, che spopolarono nelle sale d’oltreoceano e nostrane negli anni ‘80. Tra i telefilm vale la pena ricordare Dallas e Dynasty, latori dei valori di individualismo, successo e ricchezza cari agli americani. Questi programmi, per la maggior parte drammi superficiali, provocano un effetto anche nell’ambito cinematografico italiano. Ovvero, con un palinsesto di programmi ad hoc, Mediaset abbassa il livello culturale di un intero paese e di conseguenza produce anche un parallelo nelle aspettative e gusti cinematografici dell’italiano medio. Questo si puo’ riconoscere ad esempio nell’immensa – e duratura - popolarità guadagnata della commedia volgare, rappresentata ad esempio dalle avventure di Pierino (Alvaro Vitali) e dal Commissario Gilardi (Thomas Milian), e più recentemente nel successo tracimante del “reality tv” come con il programma Grande Fratello.

I due processi, quello dell’apparizione dei film e telefilm americani e della diffusione di gusti a dir poco sgradevoli, sono indipendenti l’uno dall’altro? Certamente no. Infatti, almeno in parte, il primo può essere considerato come causa. Ma la critica va bene fino ad uncerto punto. Bisogna poi venire ad alternative concrete e tirarsi su le maniche. Purtroppo, anche se la soluzione è piuttosto semplice, gli interessi di “chi conta” sono altrove. Basterebbe infatti mantenere un alto sostegno pubblico per i film italiani, intesi come patrimonio artistico del paese tutto, e dunque far sì che possano contrastare l’apparente egemonia statunitense. Dico apparente perché anche se fortissima, l’industria cinematografica americana non è certo onnipotente. E non è neppure monolitica, visto che alcuni dei suoi film, come i documentari di Michael Moore, offrono una critica interna che va invece incoraggiata.

Se, come dice John Peet sulll’Economist in uno speciale sul nostro paese intitolato Addio Dolce Vita: “…for all its attractions, Italy is caught in a long, slow decline. Reversing it will take more courage than its present political leaders seem able to muster” (Peet, 2005), allora il cambiamento deve cominciare con una maggiore consapevolezza e spirito critico da parte dei cittadini. L’alternativa è quella dell’egemonizzazione culturale degli Stati Uniti e conseguente appiattimento globale dei valori e delle idee.

Bibliografia

Francofonia nel Mondo. (n.d.). Retrieved December, 04, 2005, from
http://www.linguafrancese.it/francofonia/cultura_canadese.htm

Ginsborg, P. (2004). Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony. New York: Verso.

Globalizazzione e Scelta Culturale. (n.d.). Retrieved December 04, 2005, from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/italian/pdf/hdr04_it_chapter_5.pdf

Peet, J. (2005, November 26). (n.d.). The Economist.

Williams, R. A. (1983). Prometheus Rising. Falcon Press.

Thomas Carrozzier
May 1, 2006

Is Machiavelli a Teacher of Evil?

2006-04-03T14:57:00.000-07:00

Asking whether Machiavelli simply describes the reality around him in an attempt to delineate the characteristics of the art of exercising power, or conversely, whether he should be held accountable for perpetuating forms of authoritarian rule which came after him, is akin to asking whether Charles Darwin, because of his theory on natural selection, should be held accountable for the racial crimes of World War II. In both cases, the answer is a resounding no. Both Machiavelli and Darwin were passionate interpreters of the world they lived in, but neither should be considered as cause, even if only in part, of pathological forms of power. The question essentially asks to bring Machiavelli to the tribunal of history and to either (1) indict him for the deeds of regimes which, as will be seen subsequently, he never indicated as preferable, or (2) absolve him once and for all of such a charge. Between the two options, I choose the latter, and proceed to explain why.

A Methodological Note

Compared to other fields, political science has been reluctant to accept its status of evolutionary discipline. In particular, western political philosophy has often seemed to proceed in a non-linear fashion, by means of intuitive conceptual leaps, thus making its study all the more interesting. Nonetheless, it would be erroneous not to perceive in its development an evolutionary dialectic that is integral to all disciplines. Indeed, political science, like art, philosophy, and psychology, to name but a few, continuously confronts conceptual models, re-elaborates them and develops their potential, or, conversely, negates their usefulness and proposes alternatives. Marx, for instance, would be unthinkable without Hegel, while Hegel would be unthinkable without Aristotle. By the same token, Aristotle would be unthinkable without Plato, while Plato would be unthinkable without Socrates. This is what I mean by evolutionary process. The question posed thus contains a methodological trap. If we accept that political science is evolutionary, then it is not Machiavelli who must be brought to our tribunal, but all of his predecessors as well as his descendants.

Modern visions of democracy confront themselves daily with dynamics that were already appreciated by thinkers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The modern theoretical bifurcation between ‘democracy of the masses’ on one hand, and ‘authoritative democracy’ on the other, owes much to Machiavelli’s work. It follows that Machiavelli could be seen as inspiration to abuses of power in history and at present. However, with Machiavelli, political thought and the exercise of power are still separate. Indeed, Machiavelli writes The Prince for others to use as a reference guide, on the basis of which action may or may not be taken. This separation will not be broken until Marx realizes the indissolubility of theory and praxis. Therefore, whereas Marx could, Machiavelli cannot be held accountable for this conceptual approach.

It is also crucial to add that I find the question “Is Machiavelli a teacher of evil?” absurd: no political thinker, for the sole reason of having developed conceptual models or political doctrines, ought to be considered evil, provided we do not wish to initiate new inquisitions which will stifle independent thought, as perhaps sought by elites and their intellectual collaborators. The concept of power which tells you what is ‘good’ and what is ‘evil’ belongs to a despotic tradition that should never be replicated. We may read Mein Kampf without sharing its ideology. It is also important, for the development of political science, to understand the distinction between theory of the state and the practice of power in everyday life. As well, political thinking, in its evolution, makes up the formative base for political activity, but it is not responsible for the pathologies which derive from these theories, above all when these are misinterpreted.

On the Analysis of the Texts (The Prince and The Discourses)

To grasp the depth of Machiavelli’s thinking, it is necessary to immerse oneself in his historical and philosophical context, and attempt to appreciate the frustrations of a man who loved history and saw the potential of a country which did not yet exist. In the years during which Machiavelli wrote The Prince and The Discourses, Europe already encompassed national and political realities. France was unified under a monarchy which proved to be a perennial menace to Italy’s princedoms, while Spain was widely recognized as a tremendous military and soon to be colonial power. In Central Europe, Duchy of Austria was starting to assert itself as the leading member of the Holy Roman Empire and the kernel of a future Empire of its own. Meanwhile, the Apennine peninsula was a complex multitude of small states, both secular and religious, beleaguered by warfare, dynastic struggles and the constant attempts of the Papacy to exercise temporal power.

At this time, Florence, Machiavelli’s residence, was in a process of transition from its first republican experience, which ended with the torture and martyrdom of Friar Savonarola and the restoration of the Medici family (Skinner, 2000, p. 3). According to Machiavelli, the Medicis were certainly enlightened as far as art and literature, but not conscious of the necessity of a larger political and military vision. This Machiavellian frustration, present throughout his entire work, becomes particularly evident in the last chapter of The Prince, where he writes “Let your illustrious House therefore take upon itself this enterprise with all the courage and all the hopes with which a just cause is undertaken…” (Machiavelli, 1992, p. 71). A just and noble cause -- these words reveal a concept that is one of the pillars of Machiavelli’s thought, and help to explain what we can today call Machiavellian realism. That is, the acceptance of power as strength, and decisiveness as means, if and when a just cause is sought as an end. For Machiavelli, this just cause must be understood as national glory.

On political thinking understood as a science, Machiavelli had to start at the beginning, as he found himself in a philosophic context dominated by metaphysics. He is the first to put the problem of power and its internal dynamics, as well as the multiple relations between citizens and their governments above all else, thus demarcating the beginnings of political science. Of course, Machiavelli retains the teachings of history and philosophy. In fact, he often analyzes the past through anecdotes to reason about what should be done in the present and in the future. For instance, in the 23rd discourse, he begins with Manlius Torquatus subjugating rebel cities (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 346) to conclude that “…when sentence has to be passed on cities which are powerful and accustomed to a life of freedom, either they should be eliminated or they should be caressed. Any other decision is futile” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 350).

The teaching of the classics, particularly those of Plato and Aristotle, are present in Machiavelli’s thought. However, unlike them, he refuses to conceive of an ideal world, worrying instead about a realistically possible world. In Machiavelli, there are no discussions of ideal cities ruled by virtue and philosopher kings, as there are in Plato's Republic, nor ones ruled by saintly men inspired by god, as in St. Augustine's The City of God. In both of these cases, the discussion is consumed with an abstract attempt to depict the perfect world. In Machiavelli, the virtues of citizenship, of communal participation and of knowledge of the ‘rules of the game’ are not replaced by idealistic or theocratic shortcuts. This is what has become known as Machiavelli’s realism, according to which, worlds where responsibility is delegated are prohibited: either we all take part in the fate of our civil society, or, conversely, suffer the consequences of a delegation of power which he deems necessary only in the absence of the abovementioned form of participation (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 104-106).

Indisputably, for Machiavelli, a republic is the best form of government, at least as long as everyone participates in a vigilant and conscious way. Otherwise, it is preferable to have an enlightened Prince to guide the people. Such a proposition might seem strange to contemporary notions of governance and democracy. However, during Machiavelli’s time, the organizational form of government, as we know it today, was yet to come. In fact, The Prince begins with “All the States and Governments by which men are or ever have been ruled, have been and are either Republics or Princedoms” (Machiavelli, 1992, p. 1). This opening statement reveals a basic, and yet understandable limitation to Machiavelli’s intellectual horizons. His practical examples are strictly limited to European history, whether of the antiquity or the contemporary world. It is therefore a futile and straining exercise to encapsulate modern notions of democracy and the equilibrium of power within Machiavelli.

Let us now turn to why Machiavelli has incurred the reputation of being a theoretician of authoritative power. Discussing the choice between cruelty and clemency, Machiavelli candidly declares that “A Prince should therefore disregard the reproach of being thought cruel where it enables him to keep his subjects united and obedient” (Machiavelli, 1992, p. 43). This sentence can easily be misinterpreted and characterize Machiavelli as evil. A deeper reading of the text however, reveals that this is not so. Elsewhere, he clearly declares himself against authoritarian techniques, unless this is required by precise circumstances. He says “When unrestrictive authority is given for long time…it may always be dangerous…” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 197). Therefore authoritative means are, for Machiavelli, a necessary evil to facilitate the attainment of a common good, but they are nevertheless an evil. He never states that despotic actions constitute something 'good' in and of themselves and he explicitly considers the pathological tyranny of certain governments a fault of fickle populace and its inertia.

Machiavelli does view human nature to be corrupt such as when he states, “… legislating for a commonwealth it must needs be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 111-112). In this, he breaks with the Catholic philosophic tradition of St. Augustine and sets in motion a tradition that will see its apex in Hobbes’ concept of ‘homo omini lupus.’ This aspect of human nature, according to Machiavelli, is the basis of failure of governments that are prone to liberalism and collective legislating, but not the latter. Indeed, if it was possible to do away with individual arrogance, and the desire of more riches, the republican model would always be the best form of government. As he states, “If all things be taken into account, however, I am of opinion that…republics will be found to be more reliable than princes” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 259). Just as popular participation in political life is, according to Machiavelli, the best recipe for government: “For when the populace is in power and is well-ordered, it will be stable, prudent and grateful, in much the same way, or in a better way, than is a prince, however wise he be thought” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 254).

Once the Machiavellian aspiration for a strong and stable government is understood as a structure able to give unifying strength to a nation that is crumbling under endogenous as well as exogenous pressures, the objection of Machiavelli as theoretician of despotism or, as the question asks of evil, quickly falls. Having considered this, what other than a common good over individual priorities can the phrase ‘The end justifies the means’ be relating to? In this case, the Marxist criticism, and particularly that of Antonio Gramsci in The Modern Prince, seems accurate when it restores Machiavelli’s reputation as a theorist after a long period of harsh criticism coming from the Catholic Church. Since, with Machiavelli, we are indisputably at the heart of the genealogy of power, as later intended by Marx: either we admit that power, whatever it may be, is evil, and hence refute any of its expression, or else we accept its dynamics to guide and transform it so that all can act upon it.

Even the lesson Machiavelli draws from Rome, and the collapse of its republic, is a lesson between private interests and classes, and his modernity of thought can be summed up thusly: “…in every republic there are two different dispositions, that of the populace and that of the upper class and that all legislation favourable to liberty is brought about by the clash between them” (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 113). How could the concept of ‘evolving democracy’ be better described than through an understanding of a continuous movement in dialectic fashion between collective and individual interests? Even war, analyzed by Machiavelli as technological fact and instrument for political supremacy, achieves a positive connotation if it is a war for the liberation of the people, or means for the safeguarding of freedom. No nation is strong only because of the strength of its leader or its army, unless the constitution and the governmental structures are strong, and the civic sense of the population and the constant vigilance against autocratic governance or foreign interventions is present. Here, we find once again the common thread of Machiavelli’s thought, which recurs to Princes only in the absence of a participatory movement of the masses; the art of the possible, therefore, but with that which is desirable always in mind. A sort of renaissance realpolitik that takes us to the constitutional thinking of the birth of the modern state, as we intend it.

The Prince’s near interminable list of things to do and not do, the amount of advice on how to avoid hate and passion, choosing instead a constant cool until action becomes inevitable, are nothing other than an extreme invitation to a political vision that chooses stability, strength, and equilibrium in a context that is dominated by the interest of the few and micro-regional power aspirations.

The fox and the lion, contemporaneously, is the metaphor of intelligent and strong actions (Machiavelli, 1992 p. 46), but always in a spirit of the common good; even if the choice of the counselors of The Prince truly reflects the concept of a skilled navigator: “The choice of Ministers is a matter of no small moment to a Prince. Whether they shall be good or no depends on his prudence, so that the readiest conjecture we can form of the character and sagacity of a Prince, is from seeing what sort of men he has about him” (Machiavelli, 1992, p. 62). These words, still, are indications of a desire to enlarge power to a maximum extent, but always preserving its security and speed of action, because, obviously, there is no bureaucracy in Machiavelli’s ideal government. The maximum expansion of power, as is clear from The Discourses, is that of a republic; but a republic in which all citizens are called to civic sense and a level of collective participation in public life.

This is the last sense of Machiavellian thought, and Machiavelli’s ultimate estate, left for future conceptualizations of democracy. To think that Machiavelli is, as suggested by the question, a precursor to totalitarianism or a master of dictatorships, means forgetting all the weight he lends to citizen participation in public life. Only in the absence of such participation the government seeks shortcuts for individual autonomy regarding decision-making. It could be said that this is the case today as well. When we forget that democratic governance should represent the collective interest, abandoning true notions of civil society, then the danger of authoritarianism is always present, whether the social model is called princedom or modern democracy.

Bibliography

Machiavelli, Niccolò. (1998) The Discourses. London: Penguin Books, Ltd.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. (1992) The Prince. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
Skinner, Quentin. (2000) Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Copyright
Thomas Carrozzier
April 5, 2006

Guantanamo Bay

2005-08-23T22:24:00.000-07:00

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510632005

I advise anyone who is interested in the Guantanamo Bay issue to follow the link above. It is an extensive overview of the situation by Amnesty International, that can easily be downloaded onto your desktop in .pdf format. I want to congratulate AI for producing "Guantánamo and beyond: The continuing pursuit of unchecked executive power" and for keeping up the pressure on the U.S. government to grant these detainees a fair trial, and humane conditions of detention.

For a smaller, though still informative article, check out the April 2005 National Geographic issue and Jeannie Ralston's "No-Man's-Land".

The Guardian - Special Report: Israel and the Middle East

2005-08-22T01:11:00.000-07:00

I would encourage people to follow the link below, and check out the Guardian's special report on Israel and the Palestinians. In particular, I suggest you read David Clark's August 22nd comment, entitled "For Sharon, Gaza was just the latest act of a long war":

http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/0,2759,377264,00.html

Quote

2005-08-21T14:58:00.000-07:00

That is our starting point: rejection of a world that we feel to be wrong, negation of a world we feel to be negative.

Holloway, John
Change the World Without Taking Power: the Meaning of Revolution Today
Pluto Press, London, Sterling Virginia, 2002

Commentary on Information-Driven Economies

2005-08-21T14:56:00.000-07:00

The following is a debate/dialogue between Rob Salkowitz and myself (Thomas), that began on August 21, 2005 after I read his article "The One-Dimensional Work World" which can be found at http://emphasisadded.com/2005/07/26.html

The exchange is an interesting one, and I suggest you begin by reading Salkowitz's article, following the link above, and continue by reading the exchange of thoughts in the order below.

Thomas (Aug 21, 2005)

The One-Dimensional Work World by Rob Salkowitz is cleverly written and insightful, though I found a few points I do not agree with. In the first place, the initial analogy implies (when inverted) that all people in our "information-driven society" who do not possess the set of skills required to become a part of the public-relations elite, are necessarily going to have to struggle for "minimum wage work" or "inferior social or economic status." I mean, is this really true? As far as I'm aware of, many labour-intensive jobs (i.e. plumbing, welding, brick-laying etc.) are paid fairly well, and for the most part carried out under safe conditions, even when compared to a lot of the jobs which are information-driven. I would go as far as saying that the working class individual (understood in this instance as he/she who performs manual work in industrialized countries) is part of what can be referred to as the aristocracy of the proletariat (as Lenin called them). Can we honestly say that today, working class as previously mentioned can be characterized as "the lowest-value rungs on the occupational ladder", one that is potentially revolutionary as a result of the exploitative conditions to which it is exposed on a daily basis? At least in those countries which form the core of the international capitalist system, we know this not to be the case. The working class has thus far failed to liberate itself from capitalism here. Whether this is a result of its own weaknesses, or a demonstration of capital's strength, matters little in this context. The bottom line is that workers (including but not only those involved in manual labour) have not broken the chains which imprison them, and thus there's a need for a vision. And so I ask myself, how credible is Rob Salkowitz’s presumably remorseful self-criticism that, despite the state of affairs to which he contributes through his work as opinion creator, he along with those like him are to be blamed? And isn't his conclusion that they should "accommodate a wider range of views and attitudes toward work" out of self-interest, essentially to preserve the present system, only a way to assure that a revolutionary agenda be pushed (yet again) into reformist channels? Rob Salkowitz doesn't seem to want a different society, but merely one characterized by a more lenient ruling class, where information workers ("intellectuals") such as him may continue to prosper in the long term, thus continuing to undermine the dream which they allegedly espouse on the working class’ behalf. Of course it is important to incorporate all opinions, particularly those committed to a radically different world. But it is important to do so with a clear motive. That is, it is important to do so to actually inspire people, to convince them that a different world is both possible and desirable, not to show our benevolent inclination by allowing a few articles of dissent here and there, out of self-interest as he says (and I would contest that to continue in such a way corresponds to our self-interest). I think that those who have had the opportunity (which remains in many ways a privilege) to study and then become part of the "intellectual class" have the moral duty to utilize their tools as opinion makers to help dismantle a system they know to be unjust. Let us become what Gramsci called "organic intellectuals", the ally of the working class, and cease to be bourgeois intellectuals committed to a fictional democracy.

(Salkowitz Aug 24, 2005)

This is a strong and well-considered response from a perspective I don't usually encounter. Thank you for taking the time. A response to a few of your comments, if I may:

1. Information and communication technology are irrefutably fueling the loss of manufacturing and low-skill information work jobs (e.g., call centers) from developed economies to low-cost labor markets. The usual solution to this problem offered by policy-makers and analysts (including myself, in my professional guise) is to retrain workers in low-value jobs to do higher-value work, presumably in other information-related fields. The more I think about this prospect, the less satisfactory I find the solution. See my related article today, here: http://emphasisadded.com/2005/08/24.html

2. In my view, blue collar jobs in construction, crafts, personal services and logistics will retain their earning power, but will require increasing levels of technological sophistication. Not every worker will consider these kinds of skills important, resulting in a narrowing of opportunity for those with less aptitude or interest in technology and process. I am a strong advocate for technology providers to create products that are as transparent as possible to skilled workers, to reduce this unnecessary level of training and distraction.

3. You write: “Rob Salkowitz doesn't seem to want a different society, but merely one characterized by a more lenient ruling class, where information workers ("intellectuals") such as him may continue to prosper in the long term, thus continuing to undermine the dream which they allegedly espouse on the working class’ behalf.” I recognize here the traditional Marxist description of the liberal bourgeoisie, to which I can only reply, “if the shoe fits, I will wear it.” For what it’s worth, I don’t presume to speak for the working class: I trust them to look after their own interests as I look after mine. However, from the perspective of bourgeois enlightened self-interest and my own moral/political values, a society where the rewards of productivity are distributed more evenly between labor and capital, and more broadly across the occupational range of labor, strikes me as more just and more desirable than the condition that we are now tending toward.

Thanks again for the thoughtful review. I will bookmark this page and post a link the next time I update my template.

Thomas (Aug 26, 2005)

The fact that numerous jobs are being outsourced to other countries is irrefutable. That is the beauty (or so we’re told) of capitalism, of globalization. It is a system based on profit, so why should it care whether workers in the U.S. or in Canada (for instance) are fired and told to upgrade their skills to meet the demands of the labour market? Now, not unlike you and many others I think that such a system is not the only way to go, and that there are alternatives. Where we disagree, I’m afraid, is on the kind of alternative.

From what I can see you’re coming from a liberal perspective while I’m coming from a socialist perspective. Nonetheless I think there’s room for compromise.

In the first place, people like you who are in a position to make a difference (by reaching an audience and influencing their opinion, setting the agenda so to speak) should begin by writing what they truly think. How much is your integrity worth? It’s one of those few things you cannot buy with a Master Card, and therefore priceless. Secondly, why do you say that you should look after your interests and the working class after its interests? From your article I gathered that we are all just people, and that despite our differences we should be able to live peacefully alongside one another and prosper. But the “looking after my own interests”, and not those of my neighbour because he is a welder, whereas I am a writer, conflicts with this main argument of yours. Such an attitude (self interest, and again I doubt it is in our interest to go down this road) reinforces the divisions which capitalism thrives on, and which we should try to destroy. If we become atomised consumers, each of us too busy looking after our own interests, we regress as a people and at the same time realize the dream of the capitalist system.

I believe it is possible to change, and even if we can only create a more lenient ruling class, I would welcome such an achievement. But this will not happen unless we are willing to change ourselves. “Intellectuals” should start by being honest with themselves and acting according to their principles. This has nothing to do with Marxist thought, it is in my opinion plain common sense.

I will be posting a critical article on the American educational system. I welcome your thoughts, and hope to continue the discussion. I have not read your newest article “Workforce Development and the Lessons of Urban Planning”, but I will do so shortly.

Foreign Policy of Major Powers

2005-08-21T14:45:00.000-07:00

Below is a collection of foreign policy-related article summaries and general commentary of articles which appeared in some of the world's more reknown newspapers during the last six weeks.

General Comments

To this day, states remain the international order’s key political entities. Thus, when discussing foreign policy, we are dealing with states and the extension of their political elites’ interests in the international realm. Foreign policy analysis involves a fundamental exercise: dissecting a state’s behaviour from its rhetoric. That is, the analyst’s task should be to recognize, as critically and dispassionately as possible (exposing one’s sources and bias), what motivates a state’s behaviour beyond the principles which are claimed by that very state to underlie its foreign policy.

In this particular exercise, I collected two newspaper articles per week, in order to gain a basic understanding of current foreign policy issues. Though the topics are complex and varied, the weekly perusal of the world’s major newspapers reveals a few unassailable truisms. Namely, that the United States is the world’s hegemon, essentially omnipresent in all major foreign policy decisions even if only indirectly, and that the geo-political regions which draw most attention at present are the Middle East, Central Asia and the Far East. In particular, three issues can be seen as the current drivers of the world’s foreign policy activity in these regions: (1) the proliferation of nuclear programs in what are sometimes referred to as rogue states (i.e. Iran and North Korea), (2) the rise in terrorist activity by non-state actors, and the implications to the security and intelligence structures of states accused of perpetrating new forms of imperialism, and (3) the geo-political importance of these nations concerning the extraction of natural resources and the deployment of army forces to secure these.

Studying foreign policy remains relevant, and has perhaps become more important than ever. After the New York, Madrid and London terrorist attacks, and after the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the world is experiencing a "takeover" by the extremist camps. Understanding the foreign policy of the United States and of the world’s major powers, and their effects throughout the world (i.e. the death of thousands of innocent civilians, and giving fertile ground to groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arab world), seems essential if citizens around the globe are to shape and preserve the world they live in.

Valli, Bernardo
Ma le Armi non Bastano
La Repubblica
July 8, 2005

This article appeared in La Repubblica immediately following the first series of the London terrorist attacks. Beyond condemning the vileness of the action, Valli’s analysis points to the seemingly trouble-free ability of groups such as Al Qaeda to find fertile ground and enroll new recruits. In light of the attacks on Madrid and London, he goes on to purport that the strategy of the international community, and in particular of those nations belonging to the G8 to fight terrorism, requires a shift: from one based on rhetoric, to one based on international cooperation.

Younge, Gary
Blair’s Blowback
The Guardian
July 11, 2005

In this article, Gary Younge essentially attacks Britain’s foreign policy, and shows that to remove the London attacks from their greater context is a mistake. That is, to be able to understand the cause of the attacks on London (without in any way excusing such acts), Tony Blair’s government should review its own behaviour in Iraq, where along with the United States it is primarily responsible for the death of 100,000 Iraqis. He concludes with a quote by Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, which sums up his argument: "The net result of the war on terror is more war and more terror."

Editorial
Going Nowhere on North Korea
The New York Times
July 16, 2005

In this Editorial, the New York Times condemns what has been the Bush administration’s approach to North Korea and its eagerness to establish a nuclear program. In fact, it is claimed that thus far the rhetoric about North Korea by Bush and his team has been detrimental. The New York Times goes on to show that in order to stop Pyongyang’s production of nuclear weapons, and secure its compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States should offer North Korea "formal security guarantees and significant economic assistance."

Charara, Walid
Constructive Instability
Le Monde Diplomatique
July, 2005

Charara’s article deals with U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. He argues that Bush bases this policy on the work of people such as Natan Sharansky, Bernard Lewis, and Fouad Ajami. As the title suggests, the United States is not interested in stability in the region, but rather an instability that will allow the U.S. to exploit the divisions within the Arab World according to its own interests (i.e. petroleum). Charara cites Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq as examples of this strategy, which can be summed up in dividing and conquering.

Editorial
A New Nuclear Era
The Washington Post
July 20, 2005

This Washington Post editorial explores the pros and cons (from an American perspective) of the Bush administration’s willingness to aid India in building nuclear power plants and importing advanced weapons. It seems clear that the U.S. is interested in promoting the rise of India in the 21st Century as a potential counterweight to China in the region. However, such a shift in policy may ostracize Pakistan’s nationalists even further and promote anti-American feelings, along with the possibility that Russia will be more likely to sell weapons to Iran and China will be less tough on North Korea.

Editorial
The Asian Power Game
Sydney Morning Herald
July 25, 2005

This Sydney Morning Herald editorial, not unlike the one above, looks at the consequences of the U.S endorsing India as part of the world’s nuclear-possessing nations. Here too, the U.S. is seen as favouring India to counter China’s growth as the regional main power. Despite the aesthetic of having established a partnership with the "world’s largest democracy", the move is characterized as Washington’s way of trading international nuclear regulations for geo-political advantages.

Bole-Richard, Michel
Aprés des années d’échanges aigres-doux entre Paris et Jérusalem, l’heure de la détente est venue
Le Monde
July 26, 2005

The article focuses on the potential thaw of Franco-Israeli relations, and the significance of Ariel Sharon’s recent visit in this context. In the last few years, the relationship between the two countries has not been a positive one, but with Israel’s intentions to pull out of Gaza and the French support for resolution 1559 regarding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, things seem (according to Bole-Richard) to be changing.

Wall, David
Bound by a Common Cause
The Japan Times
August 1, 2005

The article relates a recent meeting between Russian and Chinese heads of state to enhance the "friendship treaty" of 2001 and form a strategic partnership which includes, along with economic and intelligence cooperation, military partnership. In addition, a Sino-Russian relationship seems to have formed to demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Central Asia (as the recent SCO summit seems to suggest). David Wall claims that these latest developments, are a move to push the international order towards a situation of multipolarity.

Golts, Alexander
A Graceless Exit for Russia
The Moscow Times
August 2, 2005

According to Alexander Golts, Russia’s reluctance to remove its military presence from Central Asia reflects one of the country’s foreign policy goals: to maintain its influence vis-à-vis the United States in a region known for its geo-political importance (i.e. Afghanistan) and natural resources (i.e. natural gas). However, Golts believes the attempt to be futile, adding that "the Kremlin’s stubbornness will likely end in humiliation when the troops are sent packing all the same."

Hoagland, Jim
Ousted from Uzbekistan: Our Global Strategy Trips Over Cold War Reflexes
The Washington Post
August 6, 2005

In this article, the topic is still Central Asia (see previous article) but seen from a U.S. foreign policy perspective. In particular, the issue is Uzbekistan’s president Islam A. Karimov’s request that the United States remove its troops from his country. Hoagland maintains that by agreeing to such a withdrawal, the U.S. has not budged to the Uzbek request without motive. In his opinion, this was done in order to send a message that Karimov’s usefulness has largely eroded, and that the U.S. might seek to remove him from power in the not-so-distant future.

Bobin, Frédéric
Ombres Chinoises Sur Deux Crises Nucléaires
Le Monde
August 13, 2005

According to Bobin, China’s aims to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear program are not born out of concern for the international community. As China’s appetite for energy grows, and as U.S. presence in Central Asia threatens such a need, Beijing will try to act as a responsible actor alongside South Korea, the United States, Japan and Russia. In addition, China’s commitment is due to a real anxiety: that the nuclearization of North Korea will lead to a regional arms race, thereby undermining China’s strategic interests. It remains to be seen whether such international cooperation will bear fruit in the near future, as time is running out.

Freeman, Colin
Iran ‘Kept EU Talking’ While it Finished Nuclear Plant
The Daily Telegraph
August 14, 2005

The possibility that Iran will be next on the UN Security Council’s blacklist is examined by Freeman in this article. The country’s foreign minister’s latest remarks on how the European Union (and particularly the role of the UK, France and Germany) gave Iran the extra time needed to continue in its development of a nuclear program, are portrayed as instigating the U.S. to take military action in the near future.